Online scrutiny of people with nice cars: A comparative analysis of Chinese, Russian, and Anglo-American outrage by Huang, Q. et al.
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which 
permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work  without further permission provided the original work is 
attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
https://doi.org/10.1177/2059436420901818
Global Media and China 
Volume XX: 1–14
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines: 
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1 77/20594364209018
journals.sagepub.com/home/gch
Online scrutiny of people with  
nice cars: A comparative analysis  
of Chinese, Russian, and  
Anglo-American outrage
Qian Huang , Rashid Gabdulhakov  
and Daniel Trottier
Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
Connected by platforms and equipped with mobile recording devices, social media users 
are able to conduct near-constant mutual scrutiny. Such mediated scrutiny sometimes 
escalates to public denunciations online and even mediated or embodied interventions. A 
recurring theme of such scrutiny can be observed not only on Chinese social media but also 
on platforms in Russia and elsewhere, in which hostility is openly expressed towards people 
with nice cars (i.e. late model, luxury, foreign vehicles). In these cases, nice cars are not 
merely a fact provided by participants in their denunciations; they also serve as an implication 
of the privileges the owners might possess. By juxtaposing cases in China against other socio-
political contexts, the research intends to achieve a better understanding of how and why 
nice cars are rendered meaningful by participants via mediated scrutiny on social media in 
China and beyond. The research collects and analyses relevant social media discourses on 
platforms including Sina Weibo (China), YouTube (Russia), and Facebook (United Kingdom; 
Australia; United States). Comparing and contrasting cases in different countries, the research 
demonstrates various forms of critical and populist sentiments that are shaped by unique 
socio-cultural and political contexts.
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Introduction
Connected by platforms and equipped with mobile recording devices, social media users are able 
to conduct near-constant scrutiny of peers and strangers alike. Such mediated scrutiny sometimes 
escalates to public denunciations online and even mediated or embodied interventions, which can 
be understood through the lens of digital vigilantism (DV) (Trottier, 2017). When witnessing 
something that is perceived as offensive, citizens often use digital devices to record the actions/
speech, expose and try to attract more attention on social media, and then seek retaliation in various 
forms. This includes seeking to identify the individual caught engaging in offensive activity, but 
also editorialising about broader social categories to which they belong, as well as related social 
conditions. Among the actions that are perceived offensive, a recurring theme can be observed 
not only on Chinese social media but also in Russia and elsewhere, in which hostility is openly 
expressed towards people with nice cars (i.e. late model, luxury, foreign vehicles). However, due to 
different socio-political contexts, the patterns and media narratives differ in the above- mentioned 
societies, and as such warrant consideration.
In China, DV incidents are typically disorganised, and the participants are usually temporarily 
and digitally mobilised due to the exposure of behaviours deemed offensive on the Internet (Heng 
et al., 2019). Therefore, such offence is often a cogent representation of the current social conflicts 
or social norms and values due to their capacity to mobilise Chinese netizens in large scale without 
formal organisation. DV cases about car-related issues take place constantly in China. The narratives 
in initial denunciatory posts of these DV cases often focus on the brands of cars, which provoke 
public reactions.
In Russia, a vigilante group StopXam (Stop a Douchebag, n.d.)1 also shows heightened interest 
in motorists with nice cars when trying to identify and expose bad driving/parking practices. 
StopXam participants approach perceived traffic violators and place stickers on their windshields, 
reading ‘I spit on everyone, I drive where I want’; the process of retaliation is filmed, edited, and 
uploaded on the group’s YouTube channels (Gabdulhakov, 2020). While StopXam participants 
claim to be indiscriminate, they frequently target drivers on expensive cars with VIP licence 
plates.2 YouTube videos featuring this form of peoples’ justice are viewed by millions and some of 
the more spectacular cases reach traditional media.
In the West, a general state of class awareness has recently been manifest through critical dis-
courses about billionaires (Roberts, 2019) and divisions between the so-called ‘99%’ and ‘1%’ in the 
context of the Occupy movement (McCleave Maharawal, 2013). Yet while roadside offences like 
bad parking are captured and discussed in local Facebook groups, there is a curious absence of con-
cern for the owners and drivers of ‘nice’ cars, notably the social categories to which they belong, and 
the broader state of affairs that these categories and related privileges may come to symbolise.
Even though the patterns and narratives vary between societies, the commonality is that cars 
are not only a prominent means of transportation in public spaces but are also rendered meaning-
ful by DV participants in online denunciation, which may reveal the morality concerns, social 
norms and social conflicts in different societies (Trottier, 2017). Therefore, by analysing the 
framing of original online denunciations related to ‘nice cars’ in China, Russia and major 
Anglophone countries, this research intends to understand how and why nice cars are (not) ren-
dered meaningful by vigilant digital media users across socio-political contexts. It is not the 
intention of the article to exhaustively account for how social class is discursively manifest in the 
above-mentioned societies. Rather, the article explores the influence of different socio-political 
contexts on how luxury vehicles become sources of online denunciation in these societies.
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From scrutiny to denunciation: the importance of framing in DV
The scrutiny and discovery of a perceived offence are typically understood as events that set off 
DV campaigns. Such offences include problematic behaviour in public spaces such as roadways 
and parking lots, but also statements that may have been uttered online. In most cases, such behav-
iour may already take place in conditions that are recognised as being ‘in public’, yet subsequent 
responses serve to augment the visibility of the target to a wider audience, as well as reframe their 
behaviour in a denunciatory light. When presenting the visual evidence, DV participants also pro-
vide a description of the events leading up to their footage. In these original posts, DV participants 
editorialise and frame the offence with information they provide, including the identity of the 
perpetrator, the sequence of events, and any dialogue exchanged in the process. Consequently, the 
audience will perceive and evaluate the incident and involved actors under the influence of framing 
(Goffman, 1974; Reese, 2001), which is crucial in the later DV stages of taking offence and 
denouncing targets and their behaviour. In addition to the initial discovery of offence, offence-
taking also happens when a broader audience is exposed to the original denunciatory posts, which 
can lead to a larger scale and further rounds of mediated denunciation.
Such offence-taking and denunciation can be conditioned by participants’ moral concerns, social 
identity, and their confidence in the institutions on relevant issues (Trottier, 2019). Establishing 
moral grounds to frame an offence are typically based on pre-existing concerns already in public 
discourse. For instance, anti-paedophile vigilante groups operating in the United Kingdom might 
frame their campaigns in reference to high-profile incidents of child sexual abuse (Warrington, 
2018). Yet such claims and grievances may equally be (re-)articulated in response to an offence, 
especially those which may be rather exceptional in frequency or severity (cf. Schneider & Trottier, 
2013). While concerned with commonly held and even hegemonic values, denunciations them-
selves can be scrutinised in public discourse, and become subject to counter-denunciations.
Participants also frame DV incidents in ways that reflect or appeal to social groups they identify 
with. They may associate a place, a tradition, or an abstract value with the community which they 
believe they belong to and need to be defend (Trottier, 2019). By framing the offence as a threat to 
these elements, DV participants are able to mobilise citizens who share the same social identity to 
denounce the target. Participants may also be judged based on widely held perceptions of whoever 
is making a denunciation, for example, if they belong to a marginalised community. Thus, while 
disparity between extreme wealth and precarity among citizens may fuel denunciations of offences 
symbolised by and revolving around ‘nice cars’, this disparity may potentially also serve to dampen 
or dismiss such criticisms.
How participants view the state’s role in relation to offences also shapes their framing of inci-
dents. DV activities can be framed or implied to be caused by the unwillingness, ineffectiveness, 
or ineligibility of the police to deal with the offence (Trottier, 2019). In cases targeting nice cars, 
the framing of the police’s role in incidents is especially important since such cases usually involve 
traffic laws and regulations, which differs from cases focusing more on morality where the police 
may have no function, such as marital affairs or vitriolic speech.
Denunciation is thus a means to (re-)frame an event in the above-mentioned perspectives, as 
well as a call to mobilise some kind of retaliation against the target. A common mobilisation by 
digital media users is seeking job loss of targets, notably when their employer is known and drawn 
into the denunciation through platforms like Twitter (Milbrandt, 2020). In some instances, harass-
ment and harm (bethey digital or physical) are also sought. Studying the framing in denunciations 
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made against targets with nice cars can therefore help to understand the moral concerns, social 
identities, and citizens’ relationship with police in different socio-political contexts.
Methods
Given the importance of the meaning-making process in denunciations, we analysed how DV par-
ticipants frame actors, interactions and the development in their original denunciatory posts in 
selected DV incidents involving nice cars in China, Russia, and Anglophone countries, including 
the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. It is important to note that the chosen cases 
merely serve as a snapshot of some common practices and narratives in DV cases that involve cars 
and car owners, rather than an exhaustive summary of such practices and narratives. Due to the 
heterogeneous social media landscapes in the countries we research, our data collection followed 
common guidelines while accounting for variance in platforms and media formats. We collected 
the original denunciatory digital contents of nice-car-related DV incidents on the main social media 
platform(s) participants use. For Chinese cases, original denunciatory posts with photos and videos 
on Sina Weibo were collected; videos posted by DV organisation StopXam on YouTube were col-
lected for Russian cases; posts and interactions in Facebook DV groups were collected for analysis 
in Anglophone countries.
Chinese DV cases are typically unorganised and participants are temporarily mobilised; mean-
while, the high-profile cases usually attract media attention. Therefore, relevant Chinese cases 
were first identified through theory and topic-driven keyword searches in the WiseNews database. 
After identifying key cases, the original denunciatory Sina Weibo posts were collected. In China, 
Sina Weibo currently holds a monopoly position and enjoys unmatched connectivity among 
Chinese social media platforms with active verified government-related accounts, mainstream 
media and individual users including civilians, celebrities and public opinion leaders (China 
Internet Network Information Center [CNNIC], 2017). Because of such connectivity, Sina Weibo 
has been the major platform for participants to conduct DV.
With branches across Russia and in other post-Soviet republics, StopXam (Moscow) runs two 
YouTube channels, one for Russian-speaking audiences and the other one (English version) for 
international audiences (Gabdulhakov, 2018). We present a brief overview of observations made in 
regard to the video products shared by StopXam participants in their Russophone YouTube chan-
nel. As public channels on YouTube allow for sorting videos by date and popularity, we selected 
and analysed the ten most popular videos on the Russophone StopXam channel.
In the Anglophone context, we considered discourses and repertoires where luxury vehicles 
(among others) may be openly and publicly scrutinised. This includes Facebook pages and groups 
that are meant to denounce bad roadside behaviour. These groups routinely post pictures of vehi-
cles, often with denunciatory commentary, and in turn allow other users to provide additional com-
ments. By searching for ‘crap parking’ pages and groups on Facebook, we selected twenty groups 
and pages, eighteen of which are focused on the United Kingdom and two on Australia. The fact 
that no such group was identified as originating in the United States is considered in our discussion 
below. For Facebook groups, we examined posts, comments to posts, as well as comments in 
response to comments. In the case of Facebook pages, we applied the same protocol, but examined 
both messages and community, in order to interpret admin and member-submitted content.
After the data collection, in-depth qualitative analysis of the framing provided by DV partici-
pants on selected cases was conducted. Specifically, we analysed framing devices listed in Table 1, 
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which is adapted from Linström & Marais’s checklist (2012, p. 33), adopted by participants in 
selected cases. In the process of analysis, a key step we took was to determine whether patterns and 
characteristics that we identified in one country appear in cases from other countries.
‘The rich versus the vulnerable’ framing in China
DV activities targeting people with nice cars can be regarded as a demonstration of struggles 
between different social strata in China. ‘Social strata’ is a better concept compared to ‘social 
classes’ to describe the distinct social groups in current Chinese society because it focuses more on 
material and economic inequality without the strong political connotation the latter has in relation 
to the political struggle in the early years of the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s rule (Zhang, 
2017). In the past decade, the income disparity in China has increased rapidly and China has 
become one of the most economically-unequal countries in the world, with an estimated Gini coef-
ficient of 47.3 points (Jain-Chandra et al., 2018). Such increasing wealth inequality can lead to a 
greater interpersonal hostility among social groups due to perceived disadvantage and relative 
deprivation (Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2017). In Chinese society, such perceived disadvantage is 
consolidated by product brands that signify different power to consume. In this case, car brands 
mobilise social groups that perceive relative deprivation to target seemingly advantageous social 
groups. However, it is important to point out that focusing on overt hostility between social groups 
often overshadows the long overdue discussion on structural issues that result in such increasing 
disparity, including unequal access to education (Anagnost, 2008).
There are three types of DV cases involving nice cars in China, including traffic conflicts (from 
minor to severe), demonstration of wealth, and corruption or government-related privileges. The 
most common type of car-related DV case is traffic conflicts. The severity can vary: a scratch, 
violating traffic regulations, physical violence, or injury and death caused by the driver. It is 
expected that citizens pay more attention to and try to find a law-breaker or individuals who harm 
people, but the cases that draw most of the attention are those involving nice cars. A typical fram-
ing of such incidents follows this pattern: a lady/guy who drives a nice car brand harm a socially 
Table 1. Framing devices.
Category Examples
Rhetorical and 
other written/
grammatical 
devices
Word choice; metaphors; exemplars
Key words (presence and/or absence)
Sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgement
Concluding statements and paragraphs
Technical devices Headlines; subheadings; photo/video captions and subtitles; leads
Photographs and videos
How is the development of incident described
How are the actors described
How are the actors labeled
What elements are present or absent
All sources of information in articles
Who are quoted
How are they identified
Where is the quote placed in the story
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disadvantaged individual. High-profile cases of this type include Maserati driver beat up food 
delivery guy in 2017, Lady driving luxurious car ganged up on security guard after a dispute in 
2016 and Volvo driver insulted a taxi driver as ‘inferior’ in 2015.
Another prominent type of case is caused by the owners of luxurious cars showing off their 
wealth. In this type of case, the target does not have to overtly break any law. Rather, their vehicle 
serves as a form of conspicuous consumption that offends netizens and potentially raises questions 
about the legality of the acquired wealth. The ‘Guo Meimei’ case is the most representative instance 
of this type and it even became a commonly agreed term to use when referring to people engaging 
in similar conduct (Link & Qiang, 2013).
Nice cars that demonstrate corruption or government-related privilege are also a common sub-
ject in DV cases in China. The gongche (public service car) has a connotation of government 
officials’ privileges that lingered from a previous era, when such privileges were commonly 
accepted. However, Chinese citizens started to realise how problematic it is to use public service 
vehicles for private affairs, and the Internet enabled them to voice such grievances. The access to 
so-called public service cars had been criticised as a symptom of corruption (Notar, 2014) because 
they are often used by officials for personal affairs, such as picking up children and travelling. This 
type of case gradually disappeared after Xi Jingping took power in 2013. The central government 
reformed the public service car system in 2014, cancelling the cars for officials who had a rank 
lower than sub-provincial (ministerial) level (Xinhua News Agency, 2014). Together with the pub-
lic service car system reformation, the intense anti-corruption movement started by the central 
government may have contributed to the decrease of such cases (Ke, Liu, & Tang, 2018).
Several characteristics can be identified in DV participants’ framing. When a conflict is involved, 
as in most instances of the first type, people with nice cars are juxtaposed with disadvantaged peo-
ple. The former are typically presented as blameworthy, while the latter are meant to elicit sympathy. 
Participants achieve such framing first by naming the car brand or simply using haoche (nice car) to 
represent the target. The brands mentioned include Audi, BMW, Buick, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, 
Land Rover, Maserati, Bentley, and Volvo. What makes the contrast more drastic is the emphasis 
participants place on the vulnerable identities of the other party, for example, age (elder, child) or 
job (parking lot attendant, security guard, delivery man, taxi driver). These labels often emphasise 
physical vulnerabilities associated with age, and also vulnerable social status brought by jobs that 
are temporary, badly paid, and physically demanding. In addition, DV participants mobilise Chinese 
netizens by highlighting aggressive actions the target engages in and/or the rude speech the target 
utters. For instance, words like ‘insult’, ‘slap’, ‘beat up’, ‘break’ (a body part), and ‘gang up’ are 
often used to describe what the target did to the other party, and the targets often utter curse words 
or insults such as ‘you are inferior’ and ‘you worthless security guard’. Pictures and videos are also 
presented as evidence of the transgressions. With these rhetorical and technical devices, DV partici-
pants frame traffic conflicts as the rich bullying the weak, which moralises incidents and both par-
ties involved, and mobilises more Chinese netizens to become DV participants.
DV participants also generalise the target as a questionable social group and the incident as a 
problematic social trend in their framing. Even though the initial DV participants sometimes 
refrain from directly associating the target with a social group in the original post, their binary 
framing tends to provoke such links to be drawn by other participants when they comment on and/
or repost the original Weibo post. The fact that the targets are driving nice cars is often interpreted 
as an indication of the social group the targets belong to, such as government officials, rich peo-
ple, heishehui (mafia), baofahu (nouveau riche), and chaiqianhu (the relocated)3. The participants 
then adopt such generalisations to make comments about certain problematic social trends. For 
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instance, shaming from DV participants commonly include statements like ‘in this society, if you 
have the money, you will rule’, ‘It seems he’s connected to the mafia. Otherwise how can he be 
so aggressive and audacious?’, and ‘They are definitely the relocated. So rude and vulgar! You are 
rich, so what?’. By associating the car brands to certain social groups, the Chinese DV partici-
pants voice their concerns, dissatisfaction, and anger about social problems, especially about the 
increasing gap between rich and poor (Jain-Chandra et al., 2018) and the consequences of such an 
increasing gap.
The absence of criticism against the police in participants’ framing is intriguing. As mentioned 
before, DV participants often frame their activities as a result of the unwillingness, ineffectiveness, 
and ineligibility of the police to deal with the offence (Trottier, 2019). However, in Chinese nice 
car DV cases, most participants tag the official Weibo accounts of local police or relevant institu-
tions, informing them of the offence and demanding reactions, without criticising or implying that 
the police is incompetent. Official local police accounts usually respond promptly, promising that 
they are looking into the case, soliciting more information, or announcing the outcome of cases. 
The lack of negative framing of police is broadly indicative of the positive attitude Chinese citizens 
have towards the law enforcement (Wu et al., 2012).
Through the framing in their posts and comments, Chinese DV participants render nice cars 
meaningful when moralising the offence and shaming the target. Nice cars, sometimes even com-
mon vehicles, have been symbolic in Chinese society. Before the opening and reform, private cars 
were associated with ‘a bourgeois lifestyle’ (Zhang, 2017, p. 42) and passenger cars were only 
enjoyed by high government officials (Barme, 2002). Therefore, the word gongche has a connota-
tion of privilege and political power originating from and lingering after that period. With the devel-
opment of the car industry due to Deng’s policy, the private car ownership rose dramatically in the 
early 2000s, and the connotation of cars also changed to some degree (Barme, 2002). To own a car 
means to be able to live a modern, comfortable, and mobile life, which comes from and in turn indi-
cates superior economic power. An imported and foreign car is the most visible symbol of modern 
and social status of its owner (Hooper, 2007), because in China, to own such a car requires resources 
beyond the means of an average salaried professional (Zhang, 2017). Therefore, nice cars have 
always been associated with social status and power in Chinese society. When people with different 
economic and social power interact and negotiate in streets, highways, and other traffic-related 
public spaces (Urry, 2000), this symbolic meaning is consolidated and amplified, which leads to the 
above-mentioned binary framing of the rich versus the vulnerable in Chinese netizens’ DV activities 
against people with nice cars.
‘Road boor busters’ in Russia
Individuals and groups across Russia have been engaging in social justice with the focus on a 
diverse set of issues, ranging from capturing migrants to exposing alleged paedophiles, and regu-
lating road-traffic violations. Some of such vigilantes act as “entrepreneurs”, monetising acts of 
retaliation over perceived breaching of legal and moral norms by the targets (Favarel-Garrigues, 
2019). Amid tightening control over citizens’ self-expression online, some forms of digitally 
mediated activism are encouraged and supported by the state in Russia (Gabdulhakov, 2018; 
Daucé et al., 2020). Since its creation in 2010, StopXam enjoyed both formal and informal 
endorsement by Russia’s political elite. Group members have personally met with state learship 
and received presidential grants in support of their activities (Gabdulhakov, 2018). StopXam has 
been extensively covered in Russia’s traditional media, while respective framing of participants 
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has been inconsistent over time, ranging from full endorsement to intense scrutiny of the motives 
for participation (Gabdulhakov, 2020).
StopXam positions itself as a force that unlike the police is not afraid of approaching people in 
fancy cars with VIP licence plates and tinted windows. Moscow’s StopXam is operating in a con-
text where drivers with money and power seek ways to defy traffic laws by putting a migalka 
(ambulance/police siren) on top of their vehicles (Ioffe, 2011), sparking rampant irritation from 
fellow drivers already coping with some of the world’s worst traffic (The Moscow Times, 2018). 
Thus, when participants retaliate against the owners of luxury vehicles, they are performing a 
certain class-struggle-like act, where the all-powerful people who are used to getting away with 
mischief appear to be approached by the fearless youth and brought to justice.
The selected ten most popular StopXam episodes from its Russophone YouTube channel range 
from five to nineteen million views and feature a diverse set of drivers in terms of their ethnicity 
and gender. Although the featured vehicles approached by StopXam range in their ‘prestige’ and 
value (from Soviet-era Ladas to a Lamborghinis), severe confrontation and physical fights between 
participants and targets in luxury vehicles are present in all selected episodes. Participants follow 
a persistent structure where several drivers are featured in a single video, while the central target 
is given more airtime and tend to inspire the episodes’ catchy titles. In nine out of ten videos 
analysed, the central target owns an expensive vehicle; six of which feature VIP licence plates. 
Table 2 below provides a brief overview of selected videos in terms of their release date, number 
of views, and featured targets/vehicles.
As can be seen in the table, most popular StopXam episodes (five out of ten) take place in 2016, 
which is also the year when the ‘movement’ was shut down for the first time, based on the decision 
of the Ministry of Justice (NTV, 2016). StopXam was rehabilitated later in 2016, and shut down 
again in 2018 based on the decision of the Moscow City Court (Novayagazeta, 2018). As of 2019, 
the group continues its operation and regularly uploads new episodes on YouTube.
Based on the content analysis of selected episodes, several observations can be made in terms 
of participants’ framing of the targets. In conversations that took place between participants and 
their targets, such themes as sexuality, perceived gender roles, female dependency on rich spon-
sors, and issues of national belonging came to the surface.
An episode titled ‘The Day of the Car Guard’, published on 11 July 2016, begins with a smiling 
StopXam participant gluing the group’s sticker on a luxurious Mercedes, while telling the public 
that this act, in fact, is ‘not bringing [him] any joy’ (StopXam, 2016a). The central targets in the 
episode are several Russian middle-aged men, on a Mercedes-Benz Gelandewagenn with VIP 
licence plates, escorting a Mercedes-Benz minibus. The men are evidently bodyguards protecting 
the boss’ vehicle from receiving the infamous sticker. After several minutes of verbal argumenta-
tion, the sticker is placed on the windshield of the minibus, which escalates the conflict as the tar-
gets ask the participant to ‘step aside’ with them. To this, the participant responds ‘I am not stepping 
aside with men, I have a traditional sexual orientation’ (StopXam, 2016a). We observe a reinforce-
ment of homophobic values by these vigilantes.
In the episode from 3 May 2018, titled ‘A Muscovite Born and Bred’, one of the participants 
states that ‘all troubles are caused by women’ and urges the female target to ‘behave like a woman’ 
(StopXam, 2018). In addition, the participant addresses the public ‘who would want to marry such 
a woman?’ and adds ‘no one would trade a hamburger for you!’ (StopXam, 2018). The viewers are 
reminded of the perceived gendered variations in female-like and non-female-like behaviours, 
while reinforcing the idea that all women anticipate successful marriage and should, therefore, 
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behave in a ‘marketable’ manner. The target is featured stating that she is a ‘Muscovite born and 
bred’ – a statement mocked by participants in the episode’s title. Given Moscow’s status as the 
capital and financial centre of Russia, the city attracts new residents, creating tensions between the 
‘original’ Muscovites and the newcomers.
During the confrontation with a driver framed as a ‘Chechen’ in the episode titled ‘Chechen 
Derby’ published on 19 September 2016, participants assure the target that they are Chechens 
themselves, and, therefore, are not intimidated by him (StopXam, 2016b). Finally, the most 
popular StopXam episode, with nearly 20 million views is dated 14 November 2014 and is titled 
‘Tracksuit and AK 47’. After a brief confrontation with the ‘Caucasus’ drivers in a black Lexus, 
participants are aided by a stranger in a tracksuit – an outfit affiliated with the Russian working-
class males in the periphery. The driver in the track suit (participants blurred his face in the 
video) begins to threaten targets in the Lexus with an AK47 machine gun and commands them 
to ‘Get in the car and drive away!’ (StopXam, 2014). This encounter illustrates several layers of 
frustrations on Moscow roads and in the Russian society at large, including the struggles between 
the rich and the working class, as well as tensions between Russians and people from the 
Caucasus. The episode also demonstrates that weapons can serve as an unbeatable argument in 
such confrontations.
Table 2. Overview of selected StopXam episodes.a
Episode title Date published Number of 
views
Main target’s vehicle Main target’s 
descriptive markers
Tracksuit and AK-47 18 November 2014 19,576,592 Lexus with VIP 
licence plates
Caucasus males
Cutie Worldstar 29 June 2015 15,013,315 Kia SUV with VIP 
licence plates
Female
Chechen Derby 19 September 2016 11,600,414 Mercedes-Benz Chechen male; 
sports figure in 
Russia
137 Crazies Catcher 19 May 2014 7,628,649 Toyota SUV with  
VIP licence plates
Female
A Muscovite Born 
and Bred
03 May 2018 7,171,474 Mazda Russian female; 
‘third-generation 
Muscovite’
Get a Shovel 26 January 2016 7,131,845 Audi with VIP licence 
plates
Russian male; 
the driver of an 
‘important boss’
Baseball Russian-
Style
31 January 2016 6,941,704 Toyota SUV Russian males
The Exorcist 21 March 2016 5,529,802 Porsche and 
Lamborghini with  
VIP licence plates
Russian female
Guest Star Davidych 04 February 2015 5,424,659 Toyota SUV Russian males
The Day of the Car 
Guard
11 July 2016 5,094,554 Mercedes-Benz with 
VIP licence plates
Russian males; 
bodyguards
aData related to the number of views last updated on 12 October 2019.
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‘Crap parking’ and the missing narrative in the West
[S]ocialism never took root in America because the poor see themselves not as an exploited proletariat but 
as temporarily embarrassed millionaires. (Wright, 2004, p. 124)
In this study, the Anglophone context is understood as including the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Australia. In view of significant cultural and political differences between these 
countries, our aim here is not to account for the contours and content of an expansive category, but 
rather to treat their denunciatory practices as a broader counterpoint to the tendencies described in 
the Chinese and Russian contexts. Media discourse in this context is shaped by the normalisation 
of class stratification. The above quote exemplifies a comparative sense of support among middle- 
and working-class Americans of policies that exclusively benefit the wealthy. Recent political and 
economic discourse in these countries is characterised by the reframing of the wealthy as ‘job crea-
tors’ (Peck, 2014). These beliefs have recently culminated in articles in the press and digital plat-
forms claiming that billionaires should not be labelled as such, due to potentially stigmatising and 
incendiary connotations (Cowen, 2019).
In terms of scrutiny and denunciation of owners of nice cars, there is a dearth of comparable 
mobilisation of tropes in the United States. It may be possible to locate some errant discussion 
about rich people and their vehicles, given the magnitude of digitally mediated content. However, 
when instances of scrutinising public spaces does locate such vehicles, it does not expand on the 
social significance of the drivers of nice cars, nor does such a potential conversation gain any trac-
tion beyond the immediate group or page in which it first appears. One approximation of the 
denunciation seen in China and Russia is the range of so-called ‘crap parking’ communities, which 
themselves are primarily UK and Australia-based. These include Facebook groups and pages 
where members publish photos of cars parked in a manner that cause offence. These groups tend 
to be localised: not only are they typically named after a city or town, but the central content 
(photographs of vehicles) are localised through licence plates (which are typically not concealed 
by the uploader), as well as when submissions include geolocation details. These groups do not 
discriminate in terms of vehicle. Rather, nice cars are featured prominently alongside inexpensive 
models in photos and in discussions that may follow.
These groups serve to make particular motorists visible to scrutiny and denunciation. While 
many photos are taken from inside another vehicle, others include a baby carriage in the frame, 
usually when a parked car obstructs a sidewalk. These communities do not identify exclusively as 
either pedestrians or motorists, with only one page referring to its members as drivers. Crap park-
ing communities vary in terms of viability: while some pages and groups are scattered in their 
engagement, others are more enduring, and seem especially rooted in local cultural references (like 
the notoriety of particular supermarket parking lots), and disputes between members (over, among 
other issues, the appropriateness of photographing vehicles).
In posts where nice cars appear, it is common that there is little to no commentary, either from 
the original poster or from other community members. Given the sparse amount of user activity in 
some cases, it is difficult to attribute the lack of commentary to disinterest in class politics, or dis-
interest in the Facebook group. When users do comment, there may be an acknowledgement of the 
status of the vehicle, and some discussion of the kind of person who drives such a vehicle. The 
notion of entitlement is often attributed to these drivers, for instance, when a user states that ‘[l]
easing a BMW doesn’t give you the right to take up two spaces! Park with consideration for others! 
It’s sheer arrogance to park like this’. Users will sometimes focus on the brand of car (primarily 
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upmarket brands such as Audi and BMW) as a talking point. In doing so they link some roadside 
conduct with the brand, such as speeding off, or taking up two parking spaces in order to prevent 
their car from being scratched. Although posts and comments are typically limited to a few words, 
there appears to be some awareness of class-based associations with nice cars. In the case of a 
photo of a Range Rover occupying two parking spots, the sole comment below reads: ‘So posh 
bastard, I expect lol’.
Based on the descriptions and user activity found on these groups and pages, it is clear that they 
are not spaces for discourse or denunciation over broader societal factors that shape or determine 
bad parking incidents with nice cars. Yet these data suggest a clear awareness of class distinctions 
in crap parking communities. Even in spaces with relatively low content, a BMW photographed 
may be met with one comment, and that one comment may acknowledge class-based associations 
with the car. In denouncing luxury vehicles parking badly, a link is reaffirmed between being able 
to afford such a car, and feeling entitled to violate traffic rules. No further political-economic con-
ditions are called into question during these exchanges. There is a curious absence of further mobi-
lisation, both in terms of (a) a more explicit discussions of ‘us’ (as a group, a collective) and ‘them’ 
(nice car owners as a firm socially relevant category, rather than reduced to brand), as well as (b) a 
call to action beyond photographing and uploading parking violations.
When these data are taken together and compared to Chinese and Russian contexts, the paucity 
and absence of certain patterns are striking. First, the framing of types of case/offender (c.f. Guo 
Meimei) is restricted to a vehicle brand, or a more generic descriptor. We may speculate that there 
is a lack of a coherent ‘them’ outgroup in user-led framing. Furthermore, participants and witnesses 
in crap parking communities are framed in terms of being ‘fed up’ with traffic laws, and are also 
localised. Yet in comparison to groups like StopXam (who frame themselves as activists), interac-
tions with nice cars are routinised, such that no follow-up actions are necessary. There appears to be 
no significant distancing between targets of scrutiny and participants as well as their intended audi-
ence, many of whom can be presumed to be motorists (especially in the case of groups where griev-
ances are based in terms of parking). Denunciations against nice cars are as likely to frame individuals 
as ‘idiots’, which situates and frames their offence in terms of the motorists’ personality and mental 
faculties, rather than in terms of sociological conditions. There appears to be no coherent set of 
references to articulate grievances beyond the scale of personal troubles (c.f. Mills, 1959).
Conclusion
This exploratory study is concerned with the confluence between two kinds of public space: road 
networks and mediated fora. Both are critically vital infrastructures that each enable important 
types of mobilities: the circulation of individuals and the circulation of opinions. Obstructions and 
offences on roadways can be deliberated through social media, and there may be the possibility of 
broader discussions about conflicts between different social groups in the case of ‘nice cars’.
In China, despite different types of transgressions in DV incidents, nice cars are often regarded 
as a symbol of the resources that people from the advantaged social stratum have. Through the 
binary framing of ‘the rich versus the vulnerable’ in DV incidents, Chinese netizens express their 
grievances about increasing economic disparity without tapping into the structural inequality in 
Chinese society. In Russia, traffic violations can be highly politicised (Nikiforov, in press). 
StopXam participants are addressing the pressing issues on the roads, which tend to bring other 
types of frustrations to the surface – while featuring a variety of drivers in terms of identity mark-
ers, and a variety of vehicles in terms of their price tags and prestige. While taking on police duties, 
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StopXam participants also frame themselves as a fundamentally different force from police, dem-
onstrating that they are not afraid of approaching the elites. In doing so they position themselves as 
the embodiment of the ‘common-folk avengers’. However, in the Anglo-American context, such 
scrutiny and denunciations are relatively dispersed, and do not garner much traction or attention on 
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.
Due to the distinct media and political environments we are reporting on, the comparability is 
in some way restricted. Therefore, the purpose of this article is not to pinpoint a feature in the 
media environment that influences how nice cars are made meaningful. Rather, we wish to account 
for a wide range of discursive mobilisations in response to class/stratum-based offences, as well as 
provide some indication as to how these mobilisations are both culturally situated and susceptible 
to political or technological change.
In addition to social media, the press can also play a significant role in DV incidents through 
framing. Given our focus on social media users, we did not include the journalistic framing of such 
cases, which should be discussed in detail in future research. We also wish to investigate cases 
where national press provides coverage of foreign incidents. Methodologically, we propose to fol-
low up through interviews with participants in and/or targets of such interventions in order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of their motives, experiences and opinions about these practices.
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Notes
1. Pronounces as ‘Stop Kham’. Orthography and translation used by the groups itself is preserved.
2. In Russia, a licence plate with a specific combination of letters and digits can be a status symbol. For more 
information, please see https://www.rbth.com/lifestyle/327032-hidden-messages-of-russian-license
3. Chaiqianhu has a very negative connotation in Chinese. It refers to people who suddenly get a large 
amount of money because they are compensated by the government to relocate, which makes them rich 
but still rude and uneducated.
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